While most attempts to explain changes in voting behavior between 1936 and 1940 emphasize ethnicity and foreign policy as the chief factors in the decreased Democratic presidential vote, some accounts of the election find the sources of the increased Republican vote in the defection of middle western farmers and of upper-income citizens, both of whom are alleged to have deserted Roosevelt in large numbers between 1936 and 1940 ." However, the few studies which do find economic explanations for some of the decrease in the Democratic presidential vote also list German-Americans as an important element in the Willkie coalition, thereby merging ethnic-foreign policy and economic-domestic policy considerations.
Despite the widespread agreement among historians that members of specific nationality and religious groups contributed disproportionately to the increased Republican presidential vote in 1940, little systematic analysis of demographic or of voting data has been presented to support such contentions. Although the voters rendered the verdict in the Roosevelt-Willkie contest, as in other presidential elections, they are almost invisible in accounts of the 1940 election.
This study of the 1936-1940 voting behavior' of specific groups in Iowa attempts to ". . . use . . . local history to test traditional assumptions and large generalizations," * about the roles of nationality, religion, and size of community in the third Roosevelt election. The evidence confirms traditional assumptions regarding the large-scale defection of Germanquoted in John L. Shover, "Ethnicity and Religion in Philadelphia Politics, 1924 -1940 ," American Quarterly. XXV (December 1973 , 500-501. At least one authority suggests that "Every American, as we shall use the term, is a member or potential member of an ethnic group-racial, religious, or national origin." Charles H. Anderson, White Protestant Americans: From National Origins to Religious Group (Englewood Cliffs, 1970) , xiii.
*Gosnell, Champion Campaigner, 187; "Gallup and Fortune Polls," Public Opinion Quarterly. 5 (March 1941), 147; Robert E. Burke, "Election of 1940," History of American Presidential Elections. 1789 -1968 . ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., IV (New York, 1971 ), 2946 'Throughout this paper, the phrase "1936-1940 voting behavior" refers to the amount of change in the Democratic percentage of the presidential vote between 1936 and 1940. 'Michael Kämmen, "Politics. Science, and Society in Colonial America: An Essay Review of Recent Approaches and Neglected Opportunities,"/ourna/o/5ocia/ííijíoo '. 3 (Fall 1969), 78. Americans from Roosevelt. It offers little support, however, for interpretations such as those of Robert E. Burke or Malcolm Moos, which attribute Democratic losses to farmers, or for the interpretations of Harold F. Gosnell or of Warren Moscow,'which emphasize the defection of Roman Catholics from the Roosevelt coalition.
Statewide there was a decline of 6.8% in the vote for Roosevelt between the 1936 and 1940 elections. Changes in Roosevelt's share of the vote ranged from an increase of 0.9% (in Webster County) to a decrease of 23.1% (in Bremer County). The wide range suggests that voters in this seemingly homogeneous state responded in varied ways to the 1940 political situation.' Table I indicates the number of counties in which Roosevelt's share of the vote increased or decreased specific amounts between 1936 and 1940. Although his vote decreased in ninety-eight of the ninety-nine counties, the size of the decrease varied considerably from county to county.
Several factors infiuenced this range in the 1936-1940 voting behavior of Iowa counties. One thing is clear: counties with large numbers of first-and second-generation GermanAmericans recorded greater declines in the vote for Roosevelt in 1940 than did counties with smaller proportions of firstand second-generation German-Americans. The relationship between the size of the German-American population in each county and the size of the decrease in the Democratic presidential vote was not linear, but, as 1893 -1896 (New York, 1972 .
'"Election of 1940," 2946; The Republicans: A History of Their Party (New York, 1956), 418-419; Champion Campaigner. 187; Roosevelt and Willkie. 197. 'Unless indicated otherwise, all changes in voting behavior are based on the total, rather than the two-party, vote. Arnold Rogow, "The Loyalty Oath Issue in Iowa, 1951 ," American Political Science Review. LV (December 1961 , 869, notes that "Political, economic, and social homogeneity have been more characteristic of Iowa than of a large number of other states." In addition, Iowa has few non-whites and few immigrants from southern or eastern Europe. Iowa, Official Register, 1937 -1938 (Des Moines, n.d.), 312-313. Official Register. 1941 -1942 , 652-653.
*In all subsequent tables, the symbol N= indicates the number of counties or cities in each category.
the German foreign stock population in each group of counties, the larger the decrease in the Democratic percentage of the presidential vote. In the thirty-nine counties where firstand second-generation German-Americans were less than 8.0% of the total population, Roosevelt's presidential vote decreased only 4.4%. This was less than one-third the decrease in the most German counties in the state. In the nine counties where first-and second-generation Germans were 24.0-31.9% of the total population, Roosevelt's vote declined 16.0%.
There is considerably less evidence to show that the president lost Iowa because of an agrarian revolt.' While Iowa farmers decreased their Democratic presidential vote somewhat more than other Iowans, 11.3% compared with a statewide decrease of 6.8%, the uneven incidence of Roosevelt's farm losses suggests that factors other than specifically agrarian discontent explain the pattern of Democratic decreases in the Iowa farm vote. '" Table III indicates the wide 785-788. Official Register. 1937 -1938 . 312-313, 1941 -1942 •Because the 1940 census listed the country of birth only for the foreignborn white in each Iowa county, the 1930 census was used to establish the German foreign stock in each county because it listed both the country of birth of the foreign born and the country of birth of the foreign-born parents of the native born of foreign or mixed parentage. Table IV reveals that the 1940 "farm revolt" in Iowa was concentrated in the population in these farm precincts which actually lived on farms ranged from 82,7% in Plymouth County to 60.7% in Dallas County, Because the Iowa Official Register reported the precinct vote for only the two major parties in the 1936 and 1940 elections, while it listed the total vote cast statewide, and in each county, the figures in the text exaggerate the size of the decrease in Roosevelt's share of the farm vote compared with the decrease in his proportion of the statewide vote. When the two-party vote is used to determine Roosevelt's losses among both electorates, his statewide decrease is 8,2% (rather than 6,8%), compared with 11,3% among fanners. Official Register. 1933 Register. -1934 Official Register, 1937 -1938 Official Register. 1941 -1942 counties with large numbers of first-and second-generation German-Americans. In the nine counties with the largest proportions of German foreign stock (24.0-31.9% of the total population), the decrease in the Democratic percentage of the farm vote for president was over three times the decrease in the thirty-nine counties where first-and second-generation German-Americans were least numerous (less than 8.0% of the total population). Roosevelt's farm vote fell only 6.1% in the least-German counties compared with 19.6 % in the mostGerman counties."
The data indicates that, at least in Iowa, the widelyheralded agrarian protest was, in reality, part of a movement against Roosevelt by voters in areas with significant GermanAmerican populations. There is little evidence of a "farm revolt" in Iowa counties with few German-Americans. The role of German-Americans in the 1940 presidential election can be 785-788; Official Register, 1937 -1938 1941 -1942 studied further by comparing voting patterns in rural and in urban German-American areas, as well as voting patterns in German-Protestant and German-Catholic areas.
Although both rural and urban areas with large numbers of German-Americans turned against Roosevelt in 1940 to a greater extent than similar areas with few German-Americans, Table V indicates that the relationship between German ancestry and voting behavior was particularly strong in rural areas. The Democratic percentage of the presidential vote fell off more noticeably in rural counties with given proportions of first-and second-generation German-Americans than in either urban counties or cities with similar proportions of German-Americans. In rural counties where the German foreign stock was less than 8.0% of the total population, Roosevelt's vote decreased 4.4%, compared with only 1.7% in urban counties with similar proportions of German-Americans. At the other end of the scale, in counties where first-and secondgeneration German-Americans were 24.0-31.9% of the total population, a similar relationship between voting behavior in rural and in urban counties existed. There, rural counties decreased their Democratic presidential vote 17.5%, compared with only 7.7% in urban counties. Table V shows a relatively larger concentration of German-Americans in rural counties than in either urban 17.5% (N = 5) 7.7% (N=l)
*"Rural Counties" had no community over 2,499 population in 1930. "Urban Counties" had at least one-half of their population in cities of 10,000 and up in 1930.
"Cities" includes all communities of 10,000 and up in 1930. A 10,000 population figure was used for "cities" because the 1930 census lists the country of birth for the foreign born and for the foreign-born parents of the native born only for counties and for communities of 10,000 and up. Comparable information for smaller communities is not available.
The smaller Democratic decrease in "urban counties" than in "cities" reflects the fact that the county decreases are based on changes in the total vote, while the city decreases are of the two-party vote, the only voting data available for city precincts. When changes in the "urban county" and in the "city" vote are calculated on the same (two-party) basis, Roosevelt's urban county losses are larger than those in the cities. The decreases in his share of the two-party vote in the four categories of urban counties, from the least German to the most German, respectively, were 3.0%, 6.5%, 12.8%, and 8. 8%. Fifteenth Census, 785-788; Official Register. 1933 -1934 1937 -1938 1941 -1942 counties or cities. Three-eighths (36.7%) of rural counties had a German foreign stock that was at least 16.0% of the total population, compared with only one-third of urban counties (31.3%), and one-fourth (23.8%) of cities.
The relationship between community size, German ancestry, and 1936-1940 voting behavior suggests that the role of ethnicity in the third Roosevelt election was more complex than earlier writers realized. Despite Samuel Lubell's assertion that "... this German-American swing [away from Roosevelt was not] merely an agricultural one [because] post-election surveys in 1940 . . . showed the same pattern for German-American precincts in the cities," '^ the Iowa data indicates that Roosevelt's vote decreased more in rural than in urban areas with given concentrations of German-Americans. Lubell supplies no data to support his conclusion, while other authors who emphasize the role of German-Americans in decreasing Roosevelt's vote do not even consider the question of community size. " The Iowa findings indicate a need to study other states, in an attempt to determine if community size was significant elsewhere.
Despite the differences in the 1936-1940 voting behavior of equally-German rural and urban areas in Iowa, a positive relationship between the size of the German-American population and the size of the decrease in the Democratic presidential vote prevailed in both types of areas. At least in Iowa, the size of the German-American population was more closely related to 1936-1940 voting behavior than was the size of the community, as rural and urban areas with large numbers of German-Americans moved away from Roosevelt in 1940 more than rural or urban areas with few German-Americans. Ethnicity, in the form of German ancestry, appears to have been more important than size of community.
Interpretations which emphasize ethnicity as a determining factor in 1936-1940 voting behavior concentrate on GermanAmericans. However, they also assert that Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, and Roman Catholics in general, joined German-Americans in giving Roosevelt a significantly smaller share of their vote than they had four years earlier. '" Of these additional groups of anti-Roosevelt voters. Catholics are the most visible and thus the most accessible for an analysis of 1936-1940 voting behavior in Iowa." Among the groups usually described as responsible for the decline in the Democratic presidential vote in 1940, Catholics are second only to German-Americans. Harold F. Gosnell notes that "Among religious groups, Roosevelt dropped off most among Catholics;" Warren Moscow concludes that "Irish Catholic Democrats departed the Democratic Party in large numbers in 1940;" and Lubell maintains that Roosevelt's "... heaviest losses were among voters of German, Italian, or Irish ancestry," the latter two overwhelmingly Catholic, the first somewhat more Protestant than Catholic. "
Although German-Americans are probably more evenly divided between Catholicism and Protestantism than the members of any other large national group in the United States, published accounts of 1936-1940 voting behavior which emphasize the role of ethnicity fail to mention that characteristic of German-Americans. Lubell uses "German" and "Catholic" in such a way as to suggest that the two groups were almost identical. '' This usage overlooks both the Protestant majority among German-Americans and the minority status of Germans among American Catholics.
The traditional view that Roman Catholics contributed more than any other religious group to Roosevelt's losses in 1940 is not supported by an examination of the Iowa vote. As Table VI demonstrates, the Roosevelt vote in Iowa declined somewhat more in counties with large numbers of Lutherans ''Although Irish-Americans were relatively numerous in nineteenth century Iowa, they have always been a far smaller group in the state than German-Americans, and, by 1940, were too few and too scattered to permit a meaningful analysis of the vote of first-and second-generation Irish-Americans at the county level. Z, 872-873, 924-925, 953-958; Official Register, 1937 -1938 Official Register, 1941 -1942 (24.0-78.8% of all church members) than in counties with similar proportions of Catholics, and declined most of all in counties where equally-large proportions of residents were members of five Protestant churches which were predominantly German in background-the Evangelical Church, the Evangelical and Reformed Church, the United Lutheran Church, the American Lutheran Church, and the Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio, and Other States. "
In Iowa counties in 1940, nationality and voting behavior corresponded with each other more closely than religion and voting behavior. Iowa counties with large numbers of firstand second-generation German-Americans turned away from "Because of mergers, particularly among Lutherans, in some cases the names of these churches no longer represent what they did in the 1936 religious census. These five "German Protestant" denominations are examples of ethnic churches at the time of the third Roosevelt election.
Roosevelt in 1940 regardless of whether the counties were Protestant or Catholic, Lutheran or Methodist.
Among the German Catholic counties which reduced their Democratic presidential vote at least 10.0% were Carroll, Chickasaw, Dubuque, Jackson, and Plymouth. " German Lutheran counties where Roosevelt's vote fell at least 10.0% included Bremer, Clayton, Crawford, and Ida. The tendency of German counties to register large decreases in Democratic presidential vote, regardless of religious composition, is evident in such counties as Butler, Franklin, Grundy, Hardin, Lyon, and O'Brien. In each of these counties, fewer than half of all church members were in denominations traditionally associated with German-Americans. In these six German counties where Methodists, Presbyterians, and other non-German denominations predominated, Roosevelt's vote fell as sharply as in German counties where most church members were affiliated with traditionally German denominations. Table VII illustrates the phenomenon of considerably larger Democratic losses in each class of German counties than in any group of non-German counties, regardless of the religious composition of the counties. On the other hand, the proportion of Roman Catholics-"German Protestants" in each group of counties was unrelated to 1936-1940 voting behavior.
While German counties of varied religious backgrounds registered above-average Democratic decreases. Catholic counties with few German-Americans, e.g., Appanoose, Johnson, Monroe, and Palo Alto, reduced their Democratic presidential vote less than the statewide figure of 6.8 %. Table VIII illustrates both the close relationship between German ancestry and 1936-1940 voting behavior, and the lack of any meaningful relationship between Roman Catholicism and voting behavior. As the table indicates, German Catholic counties recorded Democratic decreases more than three times as large as those in Catholic counties with few German-Americans, 12.0% compared with 3.6%. "Religious Bodies: 1936. I, 750-754; Official Register. 1937 -1938 anA 1941 -1942 , are the sources for all data regarding the religious composition and the voting behavior of Iowa counties. 785-788; Religious Bodies: 1936. I, 750-754; Official Register. 1937 -1938 Official Register, 1941 -1942 . Religious Bodies: 1936. I, 750-754; Fifteenth Census. 785-788; Official Register. 1937 -1938 1941 -1942 German Lutheran counties voted considerably less Democratic in 1940 than in 1936, but Lutheran counties with smaller proportions of first-and second-generation GermanAmericans than the statewide figure of 11.2%, recorded Democratic decreases well below the 6.8% Iowa decrease. Among these non-German Lutheran counties were Audubon, where Roosevelt's vote fell only 410%, Humboldt, 5.7%, Winnebago, 5.1%, and Worth, 4.6%.
Church membership in Iowa corresponded poorly with 1936-1940 voting behavior. The apparent link between membership in certain denominations, e.g.. Catholic and Lutheran, and 1936-1940 voting behavior was, in reality, a link between nationality and voting behavior. Catholic counties and Lutheran counties which were also German counties decreased their Democratic presidential vote more than other counties. However, when nationality is controlled, it is clear that German ancestry, rather than religious preference, explains the above-average Democratic decreases in such counties. Catholic and Lutheran counties with few GermanAmericans reduced their Democratic presidential vote less than the statewide figure, indicating clearly that nationality is of more value than religious affiliation in explaining the pattern of Democratic losses in Iowa counties. The data confirms that German ancestry explains the voting behavior of certain Catholic and of certain farm areas more satisfactorily than does religious affiliation or place of residence. At least in Iowa, German Catholic and German farm areas recorded above-average Democratic losses in 1940, while Catholic and farm areas with few German-Americans decreased their Democratic presidential vote less than the statewide figure.
These findings suggest that interpretations of 1936-1940 voting behavior which emphasize the defection of Roman Catholics and of farmers from the Roosevelt coalition base their conclusions upon the voting behavior of German-American Catholic and farm areas. Earlier writers appear to confuse voting behavior in German Catholic and farm areas with voting behavior in all Catholic and farm areas, attributing to Catholics and to farmers voting behavior which, at least in Iowa, was unique to German-American Catholic and farm areas of the state.
II
Determining the motivation of voters is difficult and complex. Nevertheless, analysis of 1936-1940 voting behavior, combined with other approaches, suggests that World War 11, rather than the third term or other domestic issues, was the primary reason for the uneven pattern of Democratic decreases in Iowa counties between 1936-1940. However, the impact of the war on voting behavior appears to have been more complex than was suggested in the preceding discussion, which emphasized the defection of German-Americans, and thereby may have implied that the war was a liability to Roosevelt in 1940. Although World War II decreased Roosevelt's appeal to German-Americans, 1940 survey research indicates that, overall, foreign policy issues may have aided the president's bid for reelection, as some Americans voted for him because of the war, thereby offsetting at least some of the decrease in the Democratic presidential vote among German-Americans. Two types of surveys suggest this conclusion. One asked prospective voters why they preferred Willkie or Roosevelt. The second asked respondents how they would vote with, and without, the existence of war in Europe.
While the reasons given for preferring Willkie or Roosevelt may not be definitive answers to questions of voter motivation, it is noteworthy that prospective Roosevelt voters listed war in Europe as a reason for preferring Roosevelt far more often than prospective Willkie voters listed the same war as a reason for favoring Willkie, or for opposing Roosevelt. In national opinion polls two of the three most frequently expressed reasons for supporting Roosevelt concerned foreign affairs, while only one of the six most frequently expressed reasons for favoring the Republican challenger concerned international issues."
To the extent that prospective voters' declared reasons for preferring one candidate or the other are reliable guides to voter motivation, these results appear to suggest the possibility that World War II may have aided, rather than hindered, Roosevelt in 1940. Similar conclusions emerge from contemporary presidential preference polls. Two weeks before the 1940 election, the American Institute of Public Opinion found Roosevelt leading Willkie 54%-46%. However, these results were virtually reversed (53%-47%) when the same sample of prospective voters was asked: "If there were no war in Europe today, which presidential candidate would you vote for, Roosevelt or Willkie?"2'
If war in Europe aided, rather than hindered, Roosevelt's 1940 reelection bid, and if German-Americans voted considerably more Republican in 1940 than in 1936 because of the war, what groups supported Roosevelt because of the war? The usual answer to this question is that a number of ethnic groups voted for Roosevelt because of his opposition to Germany, and his indirect aid to groups and nations attacked by Hitler. However, as is so often true in American political historiography, statements regarding the 1940 voting behavior of such allegedly pro-Roosevelt groups as Jews, Poles, and Norwegians are offered without evidence that they are based on analysis of either the 1936 or the 1940 voting behavior of the groups in question."
The complexity of the role of the war in 1936-1940 voting behavior is apparent in a study by James McGregor Burns, who notes that "Pro-German and Italian and anti-British elements swung sharply against the President, and these were only partly offset by the Jews, eastern seaboard Yankee inter-'»"Gallup and Fortune Polls," 133. 'Daniel Katz. "Public Opinion Polls and the 1940 Election," Public Opinion Quarterly, 5 (March, 1941), 72-73. "Among the authors who maintain that the war in Europe and the Administration's foreign policy aided Roosevelt's candidacy among Jews, Poles, and Norwegians are Lubell, Revolt Moderates. 80, Moscovi, Roosevelt and Willkie, 190, 197; Burns, Divine, Foreign Policy, 86; and Donald nationalists, and national groups such as Poles and Norwegians who could not forget Hitler's occupation of their 'old country.' " Burns sees the war as both a liability and an asset to Roosevelt's 1940 bid, ". . . Willkie's raising of the war issue did cut into Roosevelt's vote." Yet, "Poll after poll showed that the sharper the crisis, the more the voters clung to Roosevelt. The emergency situation seemed wholly to counteract Willkie's third-term warnings."" If Burns and other students of the 1940 election are correct in their belief that because of World War II Roosevelt lost more votes among some ethnic groups than he gained among others, and if Gallup is correct in his conclusion that the war enhanced Roosevelt's standing with the voters, the apparent incongruity may lie with the supposedly non-ethnic majority, native born whites of native parentage, many of whose European origins go back to Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
The role of Americans of British descent in the election of 1940 has already been suggested by Lubell who maintains that ". . . our oldest ethnic element, the Yankee descendants of the original English settlers,"" voted more heavily Democratic in 1940 than in 1936, thereby increasing Roosevelt's percentage of the vote in five of the six New England states, at the same time that the nationwide Democratic presidential vote declined 6.1%. However, Lubell offers no evidence to support his conclusion that "Yankee descendants of the original English settlers" accounted for the increased Democratic presidential vote in New England in 1940. Moreover, even a brief reference to census data" indicates that New England's demographic history is much more complex than Lubell assumes when he implies that the bulk of 1940 New England voters were "Yankees."
Examination of British-American voting behavior in Iowa "Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion. 454-455. "huheW, Future American, 135. "Fifteenth Census. Ill, Part 1, 355-360, 1027 -1031 , 1089 -1101 Part 2, 164-168, 766-769, 1128 Part 2, 164-168, 766-769, -1132 can help answer questions about the response of that group to World War 11. Because British immigrants and their descendants were a large majority of all whites during the first 200 years of American history, they constituted a majority of all third-and later-generation whites well into the twentieth century-59. 4% in 1920, 55.3% in 1930, and 51.2% in 1940 ." Therefore, the proportion of native whites of native parentage in counties, cities, and states is a useful index to the size of the British-American segment of the population at the time of the third Roosevelt election.
In Iowa counties with the largest proportions of third-and later generation Americans, and thus of Americans of British descent, the Democratic presidential vote declined considerably less than in counties with the smallest proportions of residents whose families had been in the United States for at least three generations. As Table IX discloses, Roosevelt's vote declined less than half as much (4.8% compared with 10.6%) in Iowa counties with the largest proportions (80.1%-93.4% of the total population) of third-and later-generation Americans as it did in counties with the smallest proportions (39.6%-53-.0%) of old stock Americans. In the seven counties where over 90.0% of the population was at least third-generation, the Democratic presidential vote declined only 2.4%, little more than one-third the statewide decline of 6.8%, and less than one-sixth the 16.0% decline in the nine most German counties. Part I, lbl-112\ Official Register, 1937 -1938 Official Register, 1941 -1942 Although the outbreak of war in Europe and the apparently strong feelings of many Americans toward that war appear to explain much of the variety in 1936-1940 voting behavior, the unsettled state of American politics in the 1930s could also have contributed to the uneven pattern of Democratic losses at the end of the decade. Both the landslide proportions of Roosevelt's 1936 victory and the relatively large amount of ticket-splitting which occurred in that election suggest the possibility that Democratic losses in 1940 may have been concentrated in traditionally Republican areas, where large numbers of voters had favored Roosevelt over both Hoover and Landon without, however, renouncing the Republican party completely. Voters in these traditionally Republican areas may have returned to the GOP in large numbers in 1940, thereby contributing to both the increase in the Republican presidential vote and to the uneven pattern of Republican gains in Iowa counties between 1936 and 1940.
However, this possible explanation of the variety in 1936-1940 voting behavior in Iowa counties receives no support from an examination of voting data. In fact. Table X demonstrates that Iowa counties which were traditionally the most Republican, and those which were traditionally the least Republican, based on the Republican percentage of the vote for state auditor in the six elections (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) preceding the political upheaval of the Great Depression, registered similar decreases in their Democratic presidential vote between 1936 and 1940. The two categories of counties which had been the most Republican in the 1920s recorded Democratic decreases of 6.8% and 7.3% between 1936 and 1940. The two least Republican groups of counties registered similar Democratic decreases, 6.5% and 8.7%. The absence of any marked difference in the 1936-1940 voting behavior of counties which had been the most Republican in the state, 1920-1930, and of counties which had been the least Republican in the same period, suggests that the traditional (pre-depression) political allegiance of Iowa counties offers no explanation for the uneven pattern of decreases in the Democratic presidential vote between the second and the third Roosevelt elections. ¡Official Register. 1921 Register. -1922 1923 -1924 1925 -1926 1927 -1928 1929 -1930 1931 -1932 The absence of a significant relationship between the size of the 1936-1940 decrease in the Democratic presidential vote, and all but two of the other factors which have been examined, points strongly to several interrelated conclusions regarding 1936-1940 voting behavior in Iowa. First, German immigrants and their children decreased their Democratic presidential vote more than any other group in the state. Second, Iowa voters of British descent reduced their support for Roosevelt less than other groups of Iowans. Third, although the Democratic presidential vote decreased somewhat more among Catholics, farmers, and other non-urban Iowans than it did among Protestants, non-farmers, or Iowans who lived in more urban areas, these differences refiected the larger proportions of Catholics, of farmers, and of other non-urban Iowans who were of German descent rather than voting behavior which was unique to Catholics as Catholics, to farmers as farmers, or to farm and small town residents as ruralites. Although the Democratic presidential vote fell somewhat more in rural counties with given proportions of German-Americans than in either urban counties or in cities with similar percentages of first-and second-generation Germans, change in voting behavior between 1936 and 1940 corresponded more closely with the size of the German-American population than with the size of the community. Fourth, and last, traditional (pre-depression) county voting patterns have no explanatory value in connection with changes in the presidential vote between 1936 and 1940.
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